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INTRODUCTION

This essay might appropriately be subtitled "A Short Subject"
because intersections between the 1969 Water Right Determination
and Administration Act' ("the Act") and environmental protection
have been few, quite by design. The Act addresses environmental
concerns through a single narrow prism: the provision establishing an
instream flow program under the control of the Colorado Water
Conservation Board ("CWCB" or "Board") . This article briefly surveys
the various efforts put forth in an attempt to fit environmental issues
under the Act's narrow umbrella.
II. THE BACKDROP: COLORADO'S INSTREAM FLOW PROGRAM
In 1973, the Colorado legislature enacted Senate Bill 97 to create a
program with the modest goal of "preserv[ing] the natural
environment to a reasonable degree. The program sought to fit new
flow rights into the prior appropriation system, a phenomenon that by
1973 had begun to flourish around the West. These rights, instream

* Ms. Potter practices environmental, public land, and water law as a member of
the firm of Kelly Haglund Garnsey & Kahn LLC, Denver, Colorado. She represented
parties in Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water ConservationBoard and City of
Aurora v. Division Engineer of Water District5, two cases described in this article.
1. Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1999).
2. COLO.REv. STAT.§ 37-92-102(3) (1999).
3. Id.
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flow rights, left water in the stream. The instream flow water rights
adjudicated under the new program were assessed priorities "70 years
junior to the senior rights on most rivers in settled areas," consistent
with the prior appropriation principle of first in time, first in right.'
The law allowed for the establishment of instream flows by
accomplishing two important things: (1) recognizing that instream
flows constituted a beneficial use of water; and (2) eliminating
the
5
diversion requirement for an appropriation of a water right.
A number of water districts soon challenged the constitutionality
of the instream flow program, as well as particular appropriations on
the Crystal River.6 They based their constitutional challenge on the
provision in Colorado's constitution that "[t]he right to divert the
unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall
never be denied.0 The Colorado Supreme Court held that the use of
the term "divert" did not require diversion as a prerequisite for an
appropriation, but only negated the notion that Colorado would
follow the riparian doctrine." In short, the law survived the challenge,
but soon underwent the first of several amendments intended to
respond to fears that the program might outgrow the modest goals
initially set in Senate Bill 97.
In 1981, the legislature added four new subsections 9 designed to
address the fear that the instream flow program would interfere with
development and consumptive use of water in the state. These
amendments affected the CWCB's appropriations in many ways,
including that the Board commenced appropriation of "separate
winter and summer flow rates for its instream flow reaches and divided
the reaches to be preserved.., into shorter segments," results caused
by a water availability finding required in one of the limitations."
In 1986, the legislature authorized the CWCB to acquire water
rights for the instream flow program "by grant, purchase, bequest,
devise, lease, exchange or other contractual agreement."" The 1986
amendment also required the CWCB to request recommendations
from the United States Departments of Agriculture and Interior prior
to appropriating instream flows. The purpose of this was to give the
federal government the option of participating in the state instream
flow program instead of relying on acquisition of federal reserved
water rights, which were regarded as a far more intrusive means of

4. Steven 0. Sims, Colorado's Instream Flow Program: Integrating Instream Flow
ProtectionInto a PriorAppropriation System, in INSTREAM FLOW PROTECriON IN THE WEST
12-1, 12-2 (LawrenceJ. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, eds., rev. ed., 1993).
5. Id.
6. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water Conservation
Bd., 594 P.2d 570, 571 (Colo. 1979).
7. COLO. CONsT. art. XVI, § 6.
8. ColoradoRiver Water ConservationDist., 594 P.2d at 573.
9. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3)(a)-(d) (1999).
10. Sims, supranote 5, at 124.
11. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1999).
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protecting the environment.
In 1987, the legislature amended the instream flow statute once
again. This time it clarified that the CWCB is the only entity vested
with the authority to appropriate instream flows."3 The exclusivity
language responded to several attempts by private parties to
appropriate or assert instream flow rights, as described below in more
detail.
In 1994, the legislature added a detailed provision to the Act which
limited the authority of the CWCB to acquire conditional water rights
or to change conditional water rights to instream inflow uses. The
amendment limited the acquisition of conditional rights to water
rights located in the Yampa Basin which the CWCB could use to
recover a threatened or an endangered species as part of a species
recovery program and to4 benefit the species in a way that an initial
appropriation could not.1
Finally, in the wake of the Aspen Wilderness Workshop decision
described below, the legislature once again amended the instream flow
statute to specify the procedure by which the CWCB could decrease an
instream flow.'5

I. ESTABLISHING PRIVATELY-HELD INSTREAM FLOW RIGHTS

Citizen acquisition of instream flows began immediately after the
Colorado legislature enacted the instream flow law. In 1975, a group
of ranchers and citizens in Gunnison County appropriated flows in
several mountain streams and obtained rights to significant instream
flows for stock water, recreation, wildlife, fish, and heritage
preservation in the Taylor River and in eight of its tributaries. 6
In 1986, the City of Fort Collins applied for instream rights in the
Poudre River through a reach in the city designated as the Poudre
River Recreational Corridor. The CWCB objected on the ground that
only the CWCB could appropriate such rights. The CWCB settled its
objections with Fort Collins prior to trial on the condition that the city
formally delete the claim of an instream flow use and designate
specific, discrete points of diversion for the water rights claimed.
Other objectors continued to oppose the "thinly disguised minimum
stream flow" application. 7 The Colorado Supreme Court issued a
ruling that confirmed the right of the City of Fort Collins to
appropriate both of the rights that it originally sought. The opinion
distinguished the Fort Collins appropriation, which incidentally
protected a stretch of river between two definite points of diversion,
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Vader
17.
18.

Id.; see also Sims, supra note 5, at 12-4 to -5.
See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (1999); see also Sims, supra note 5, at 12-5.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (c.5) (I) to (III) (1999).
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(4) (a) (1999).
Amended ruling of water referee, In re Application for Water Rights of R.I.
& Sons, Inc., No. W-1991 (Colo. Water Court, Div. No. 4,Jan. 21, 1975).
City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 920-21 (Colo. 1992).
Id. at 933.
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from the CWCB's instream flow right, which ordinarily signifies the
complete absence of diversion structures.'9
In 1992, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed a water court
decree to the Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District for a
second fill of Taylor Park Reservoir for releases to produce fishery
habitat, rafting flows, and supplemental irrigation supplies.2 0 The
CWCB opposed the application, but here, too, withdrew its opposition
once the water district limited its application to use of previously
stored waters for instream uses within a defined stream reach. The
court based its affirmation of the water court on the fact that the water
district controlled river water by storage and release to accomplish the
designated beneficial uses, uses distinct from the CWCB instream flow
right purposes. Interestingly, the court affirmed the water district's
right on the basis that it provided year-round protection to the fishery,
while the CWCB right only protected fish for short periods of time.
In the eyes of a CWCB attorney, these cases:
illustrate an alternative type of instream flow right recognized in
Colorado. The alternative instream flow right is not equivalent to the
CWCB's instream flow rights since it apparently cannot exist in the
absence of diversion structures. Nonetheless, this right does allow
parties to claim an instream use of water if the applicant can prove
that prevously diverted water is being used instream for a beneficial
purpose.
Because these decisions postdated the amendment of the instream
flow statute giving the CWCB an "exclusive" right to appropriate, this
alternative
type of instream flow right apparently remains viable to this
24
day.
IV. ENFORCING THE STATE'S INSTREAM FLOW RIGHTS

While on its face the instream flow program was a nearrevolutionary development in Colorado water law, the program soon
received a variety of harsh criticisms from citizens' organizations,

19.

Id. at 931.

20. Board of County Comm'rs v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist.,
838 P.2d 840, 847, 856 (Colo. 1992).

21. Id. at 854.
22. Id.
23. Sims, supra note 5, at 12-6.
24. In Board of County Commissioners v. Collard, the Colorado Supreme Court
the validity of a private instream flow right acquired prior to enactment
statutory exclusivity language, turning back a collateral attack on the water
subject matter jurisdiction to grant that water right without endorsing the

upheld
of the
court's
court's

reasoning. Board of County Comm'rs v. Collard, 827 P.2d 546, 549, 551-53 (Colo. 1992);
see generally Christopher H. Meyer, Instream Flows: IntegratingNew Uses and New Players
Into the PriorAppropriation System, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST (Lawrence J.
MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, eds., rev. ed., 1993); Lori Potter, People PreservingRivers:
The Public and its ChangingRole in ProtectingInstream Flows, INTREAM FLOW PROTECTION
INTHE WEST (LawrenceJ. MacDonnell &Teresa A. Rice, eds., rev. ed., 1993).
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fishing groups, and environmental organizations.
These groups
criticized the program for appropriating very minimal rates of flow
and for limiting the purposes of the appropriations to preserving cold
water fisheries, while ignoring other instream uses such as rafting,
maintaining riparian and wetland vegetation, aesthetics, and channel
maintenance.
Organizations and individuals also scrutinized the CWCB for
deciding not to enforce or to protect its instream flow rights in a
number of instances. The CWCB's decisions to reduce or not to
enforce its decreed instream flow rights gave rise to several instances of
citizens' organizations taking enforcement action to the courts on
their own.. These types of actions culminated in a direct challenge to
the CWCB's authority to reduce an instream flow by failing to enforce
the full effect of the right when a developer's plans to consume water
would have reduced the CWCB's right below the decreed amount.
In City of Aurora v. Division Engineerfor Water Division Number 5,26 the
Colorado Mountain Club and Holy Cross Wilderness Defense Fund
opposed a change in the diversion points of conditional water rights
for the Homestake II water project. The change would have moved
the diversion points further upstream and deeper into a federal
wilderness area. The stream reaches that the city's water rights would
dewater were subject to decreed, junior instream flow rights held by
the CWCB, but the CWCB did not oppose the change in point of
diversion. The conservation groups argued that the CWCB's rights
and the federal reserved water rights for the wilderness would be
harmed by the diversions associated with the water project. The water
court rejected the conservation groups' challenge for three reasons:
(1) the CWCB withdrew its statement of opposition to the change; (2)
the United States Forest Service did not oppose the change; and (3)
the Forest Service had imposed bypass requirements on the affected
reaches, and the CWCB retained lowered instream flow rights there. 7
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed those aspects of the water
court's holding but vacated an inconsistent ruling that the state
instream flow rights be administered as senior to the changed points of
diversion notwithstanding the findings just outlined.
The City of Aurora case squarely raised the question of citizens'
standing to object to injury to the CWCB instream flow rights. The
water court found that such standing existed, a finding not later
appealed.
Likewise, a later case raising essentially the same issue received no
definitive ruling by the Colorado Supreme Court.8 In Aspen Wilderness

25. See, e.g., Lori Potter, The Public's Role in the Acquisition and Enforcement of Instream
Flows, 23 LAND & WATERL. REv. 419, 429-31 (1988).
26. City of Aurora v. Division Engineer for Water Div. No. 5, 799 P.2d 33 (Colo.
1990).
27. Id. at 36.
28. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highlands Ltd. Partnership, 929
P.2d 718, 726 n.15 (Colo. 1996).
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Workshop, Inc. v. Hines Highlands Limited Partnership,the court found
that "[t]he issue of whether the appellants have standing to assert
injury to the CWCB's instream flow rights is not before us and we do
not address it. '' 9 The court noted that the extent to which the citizens
argued injury to the decreed instream flow rights remained unclear,
but reasoned that since the CWCB was itself a party to the
proceedings, had satisfied itself that its interests were being protected,
and did not oppose entry of the decree, the argument of injury
asserted by the citizens was unpersuasive. 30
The CWCB's policies for enforcement of its instream flow rights
came under direct attack in Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado
Water Conservation Board.31 In that case, the CWCB held decreed
instream flows on Snowmass Creek of 12 c.f.s. year-round.32 Faced
with a proposal by the Aspen Ski Company to increase snowmaking
diversions from Snowmass Creek in the winter, the CWCB examined
the year-round 12 c.f.s. flow and determined that, among other things,
the winter flow could be reduced in amounts sufficient to allow the
snowmaking proposal to proceed.33 The Aspen Wilderness Workshop
filed suit against the CWCB in Denver District Court pursuant to the
State Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that the "decision not to
enforce the full instream flow appropriation... amounted to a
'
permanent relinquishment of a public instream flow right. 34
The
district court held that the CWCB had acted within its power to modify
its appropriation. Further, the court held that like any other water
right holder, the CWCB need not enforce its rights or use a portion of
its decreed right in excess of the amount needed. Any such correction
by the CWCB did not require water court adjudication.35
The Aspen Wilderness Workshop argued on appeal that the CWCB
breached a fiduciary duty to the public by failing to enforce the right
as decreed.36 The Colorado Supreme Court agreed. The court found
that the statutory provision authorizing the instream flow program
limited the CWCB's authority in two important respects. First, it
burdened the Board's actions by "creating a unique statutory fiduciary
duty between the Board and the people of the state so that the Board
may only appropriate the ...minimum amount of water necessary to
preserve the natural environment.3 1 Second, once the CWCB
adjudicated the minimum stream flow required to preserve the natural
environment, it was required to fulfill its unique statutory
responsibility to the public by administering its water rights
29. Id.
30. Id. at 726.
31. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 901
P.2d 1251 (Colo. 1995).
32, Id. at 1260.
33. Id. at 1255.
34, Id.
35. Id. at 1256.
36. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, 901 P.2d at 1255.
37. Id. at 1256-57.
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accordingly.3 8 If the CWCB determined that a previously adjudicated
right needed change in order to maintain necessary stream flows, it
could return to the water court to change the decree. But until and
unless that determination and change had been made, the supreme
court agreed that the CWCB's fiduciary duty to the public barred it
from administratively relinquishing a portion of the instream flow
decreed for the benefit of the public. 9
The Aspen Wilderness Workshop decision precipitated the 1996
amendments to the instream flow law. The decision and the later
statutory modification also caused a flurry of agency rule-making to
establish procedures for appropriation, for modification of instream
flows, and for addressing the related issue of when an instream flow
could be modified by inundation."

V.

THE QUEST FOR A PUBLIC INTEREST REVIEW OF WATER RIGHT
APPLICATIONS

Most Western states' water codes require that the entity vested with
power to review and grant water rights applications ensure the right
will conform with the public interest or public welfare.4 1 Such
provisions allow denial of water right applications if approval runs
contrary to the public interest.
Lacking such a public interest condition in the 1969 Act, a
coalition of fishing, environmental, and citizens' groups attempted to
establish one as a matter of common law as part of their challenge to a
major trans-basin diversion from the Gunnison Basin to the Front
Range. 2
While these objectors prevailed in arguing that the
application should be denied as speculative, both the water court and
the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that a water court is not required
to consider the environmental factors such as effects on wildlife
habitat, recreation, water quality, and property values in determining
whether the agplicant had proved that the water would be put to
beneficial use.
The crux of the objectors' argument was that the
trans-basin diversion, known as the Union Park project, would have
widespread and adverse impacts on the fisheries, wildlife habitat,
recreation, tax base, and general quality of life in the Gunnison
Basin. 4 Both courts flatly rejected this objection, holding that "[t]he
limited inquiry required to determine whether to issue a conditional
rights decree in this case does not include evaluation of environmental

38. Id.
39. See Lori Potter, Putting Some Teeth in Public Enforcement: The Colorado Supreme
Court'sDecision in the Snowmass Creek Case, 17 U. DENV. WATER CT. RPTR. 1, 2 (1995-96).

40. See2 COLO. CODE REGs. § 408-2 (1998).
41' Lori Potter, The Public'sRole in the Acquisition and Enforcement of Instream Flows, 23
LAND & WATER L. REv. 419, 432 (1988).
42. Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 971 (Colo. 1995).
43. Id.at 973.
44. Id. at 971.
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factors. 4 ' The court specifically rejected arguments that the statutory
definition of beneficial use encompassed the public policy of
protecting the environment. Rather, it found that the statutory
provision providing for instream flow protection through the CWCB
program was the mechanism whereby the state could protect the
interests of concerned citizen objectors.4 In sum, the supreme court
directed the objectors' concerns back to the legislature. The justices
stated that:
[w]e have consistently recognized that the General Assembly has
acted to preserve the natural environment by giving authority to the

Colorado Water Conservation Board to appropriate water to maintain

the natural environment, and we will not intrude into an area where
legislative prerogative governs. The degree of protection afforded
the environment and the mechanism to address state appropriation
of water for the good of the public is the province of the General
Assembly and the electorate.

Conceptually, a public interest theory is in conflict with the
doctrine of prior appropriation because a water court cannot, in the
absence of statutory authority, deny a legitimate appropriation based
on public policy. Arapahoe County offered evidence that it intended
to divert water for municipal use; this use of water has always been
deemed a beneficial use under Colorado law and has been given
priority over other competing beneficial uses by the General
Assembly. [The objectors] do not cite any authority that authorizes a
water court to deny an application for a conditional decree because
of environmental concerns, and we reject [their] invitation to create
a complex system of common law to balance competing public
interests.

VI. THE TWO LrTLE WORDS THAT CAN'T BE SPOKEN

Many Western hands have been wrung over the prospect that
Colorado water rights would someday be argued as subject to the
doctrine of the public trust.4' The dreaded day has not come to pass
here, however. The plaintiffs in Aspen Wilderness Workshop v. Colorado
Water Conservation Board were careful to base their challenge to the
CWCB's inaction upon a statutory fiduciary duty and not a common

law notion of the public trust.4 Nonetheless, the dissent went out of its
way to state that "[tihis court has never recognized the public trust

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Board of County Comm'rs, 891 P.2d at 972-73.
48. See generally Harrison C. Dunning, Instream Flows and the Public Trust, INSTREAM
FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST 4-1 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, eds.,
rev. ed., 1993).
49. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 901
P.2d 1251, 1255 (Colo. 1995).
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doctrine with respect to water.""0 The dissent argued that "the concept
of a public trust has no independent content....
Where the
legislature has provided statutory directives for the management and
protection of public resources, those statutory duties comprise all the
responsibilities which defendants must faithfully discharge."" Thus, in
the dissent's view, the CWCB's statutory responsibilities and its public
trust obligations-if any-were coterminous.
In defense of a charge of criminal trespass against boaters who
rafted through private property, the public trust was advanced as the
basis of a use right to float through the property and to touch the bed
and banks of the river.53 The Colorado Supreme Court made short
work of the argument, concluding that the common law rule giving
the riparian land owner title to the stream bed and banks was "of more
force and effect 5 4 than the public trust principle. Again, the court
noted that the argument in essence sought a change in longestablished judicial precedent and, therefore, needed to be taken to
the legislature.
VII. IMPORTING WATER QUAL=TY CONSIDERATIONS INTO WATER
RIGHTS MATEFRS

The Colorado Supreme Court addressed the relationship between
water quality and appropriative rights in detail in City of Thornton v.
Bijou Irrigation Co.,' where it held that the water court was explicitly
required to consider water quality issues only in the case of an
exchange whereby water was being actively substituted into the stream
for the use of other appropriators.
An appropriator who alleges
water quality impacts as a result of appropriative depletion, rather than
substandard discharge or supply water, receives no relief under the
present system. 58 The court stated that by requiring maintenance of
sufficient volume in the stream to preserve the effluent limits of a
downstream appropriator, a water court effectively would be creating a
private instream flow right for waste dilution, which the instream flow
statute did not allow.59
The extent and nature of water quality considerations which are
relevant to diligence applications, exchanges, and applications to
make conditional rights absolute are at issue in a case litigated in

50.

Id. at 1263 (MullarkeyJ., dissenting).

51.

Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 866 (D. Colo. 1985))

(internal quotation marks omitted).
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979).
Id.
Id.
City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996).

57.
58.
59.

Id. at 92.
Id.
Id. at 93.
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Water Division No. 1 in November, 1999. 6' Additional issues related to
the water quality restrictions on exchanges were concurrently litigated
in another case in Water Division No. 1. The results of both cases will
have important ramifications for the relationship between water
quality and water rights in Colorado.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Presently in Colorado, it would seem, all avenues for
environmental protection in water rights cases lead back to the same
intersection: the explicit terms of the 1969 Act, and, in particular, its
instream flow provision. Attempts to import common law concepts or
other non-statutory innovations into water rights matters have
generally hit a dead end. The cases make for interesting reading, but
the story has a tendency to come out the same every time:
environmental protection in water matters is what the legislature has
said that it is, nothing more and nothing less.

60. Application for Finding of Reasonable Diligence and to Make Absolute a
Conditional Water Right, In reApplication for Water Rights of the City and County of
Denver, No. 96-CW-145 (Colo. Water Court, Div. No. 1,June 28, 1996).
61. Motion by the City of Black Hawk to Consolidate for Trial All Water Quality
Issues, In re Application for Water Rights of the City of Central, No. 92-CW-168, No.
92-CW-059, No. 94-CW-036 (Colo. Water Court, Div. No. 1, Apr. 17, 1998).

